Keywords
How to Cite
Abstract
This article argues that intrinsic phenomenological certainty constitutes the ultimate condition of possibility for all phenomenality, including the very structure of the internal consciousness of time described by Husserl (2012, 2019). It argues that temporal experience—characterized by retention, impression, and protension—cannot be founded simply on a flow devoid of prior identity, symmetry, and stability. Rather, the very possibility of flow, succession, and duration presupposes absolute formal singularities, understood here as expressions of original certainty. Based on the theory of the informational singularity of self-consciousness (ISA), it proposes a phenomenology of certainty that is more fundamental and more general than the Husserlian phenomenology of time, capable of explaining not only how experience is articulated temporally, but also why something can appear as experience in the first place. The article argues, therefore, that every condition of relative possibility (temporal, relational, negative) depends on conditions of absolute possibility (intrinsic, affirmative, non-contrastive), reformulating classical notions of identity, intentionality, self-awareness, and their phenomenological foundations.
References
AUGUSTINE, Saint. Confessions. Tradução de F. J. Sheed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1999.
BARWISE, J.; SELIGMAN, J. Information Flow: the logic of distributed systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. (Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science, 44).
BRENTANO, F. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1874.
CARNAP, Rudolf; BAR-HILLEL, Yehoshua. An Outline of a Theory of Semantic Information. Cambridge, Mass.: Research Laboratory of Electronics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1953. 48 p. (Technical Report, 247).
DRETSKE, Fred I. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981. 273 p.
FLORIDI, Luciano. Information. In: ZALTA, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2004 Edition. Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University, 2004. Disponível em: [link]. Acesso em: [data].
FLORIDI, Luciano. Is Information Meaningful Data? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, [S. l.], v. 70, n. 2, p. 351-370, mar. 2005.
FRISTON, K.; KILNER, J.; HARRISON, L. A free energy principle for the brain. Journal of Physiology-Paris, Paris, v. 100, p. 70-87, 2006.
FRISTON, K. The Free-Energy Principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, [S. l.], v. 11, p. 127–138, 2010.
FRISTON, K. J.; KIEBEL, S. J. Predictive Coding under the Free-Energy Principle. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, [S. l.], v. 364, p. 1211–1221, 2009.
FRISTON, K. The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, [S. l.], v. 11, p. 127-138, 2010.
GALE, R. (ed.). The Philosophy of Time. Sussex: Harvester, 1968.
HUSSERL, E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
HUSSERL, E. On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893–1917). [S. l.]: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012. v. 4.
HUSSERL, E. The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness. [S. l.]: Indiana University Press, 2019.
JAUED, Lucas. Informational Singularity of Self-Consciousness (ISS): transition from the Free Energy Principle (FEP) to the Informational Singularity of Self-Consciousness (ISS): the ISS as the FEP’s mirror in consciousness. [S. l.: s. n.], 2025.
JAUED, L. Informational Singularity of Self-Consciousness. TPM – Testing, Psychometrics, Methodology in Applied Psychology, [S. l.], v. 32, n. S8, p. 675-679, nov. 2025.
JAUED, Lucas. Certeza antes do tempo: rumo a uma fenomenologia da informação, da identidade e da autoconsciência. [S. l.: s. n.], 2025.
KANT, Immanuel. Critique of pure reason. Tradução de Paul Guyer e Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
KELLY, M. R. Husserl and Phenomenology of Time. In: The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Time. [S. l.]: Routledge, 2025. p. 99-110.
KOLMOGOROV, Andrey Nikolaevich. Three Approaches to the Quantitative Definition of Information. Problems of Information Transmission, [S. l.], v. 1, n. 1, p. 1-7, 1965.
LIU, R. Explaining It Away? On the Enigma of Time in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, [S. l.], v. 36, n. 2, p. 277-289, 2022.
MCINERNEY, P. K. What Is Still Valuable in Husserl’s Analyses of Inner Time-Consciousness. JSTOR, [S. l.], 1988.
NAGEL, T. What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, [S. l.], v. 83, n. 4, p. 435–450, 1974.
NEUKART, F. Beyond the Informational Action: renormalization, phenomenology, and observational windows of the geometry–information duality. [S. l.: s. n.], 2025.
ROSSI, N. Modelling the epistemic states of non-ideal agents: hyperintensional accounts of justification, knowledge, and epistemic possibilitiy. [S. l.: s. n.], 2025.
SILVA, Lucas Jaued Braga Felício da. Transição do Princípio de Energia Livre (PEL) para a Singularidade Informacional da Autoconsciência (SIA): a SIA como espelho do PEL na consciência. [S. l.: s. n.], 2025.
SOLMS, M.; FRISTON, K. How and why consciousness arises: Some considerations from physics and physiology. Journal of Consciousness Studies, [S. l.], v. 25, p. 202–238, 2018.
SOLMS, M. The hard problem of consciousness and the Free Energy Principle. Frontiers in Psychology, [S. l.], v. 10, art. 2714, 2019. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02714.
SU, E. I. Pearce’s Characterisation in an Epistemic Domain. [S. l.]: arXiv, 2025. (arXiv:2502.09221).